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Abstract
Loss aversion is one of the most widely used concepts in behavioral economics. We con-
duct a large-scale interdisciplinary meta-analysis, to systematically accumulate knowledge
from numerous empirical estimates of the loss aversion coe￿cient reported during the past
couple of decades. We examine 607 empirical estimates of loss aversion from 150 articles in
economics, psychology, neuroscience, and several other disciplines. Our analysis indicates
that the mean loss aversion coe￿cient is between 1.8 and 2.1. We also document how re-
ported estimates vary depending on the observable characteristics of the study design.
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Loss-aversion is the empirical observation that decisions often re￿ect a disproportionate distaste
for potential losses, compared to equal-sized gains, relative to a point of reference. Loss aversion
is a core feature of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991,
1992; Wakker, 2010), an explicitly descriptive model of choice under risk and uncertainty which
has been widely applied and cited.1 The strength of aversion to loss compared to attraction to
gain is typically captured by a single parameter,  .
In his popular-science book, Kahneman (2011) says “the concept of loss aversion is certainly
the most signi￿cant contribution of psychology to behavioral economics” (p. 300). Indeed, loss-
aversion has been widely applied to many types of economic decisions and analyses. The most
common application is analysis of experimental decisions over monetary risks (as in the original
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). However, loss-aversion and dependence on reference points have
also been used well beyond its initial simple application to three-outcome risks. Applications
include ￿nancial asset prices (Barberis, 2013), the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler,
1995), the disposition e￿ect in asset trading (Odean, 1998;Weber and Camerer, 1998), labor supply
decisions (Camerer et al., 1997), political power of entitlements change (Romer, 1996), majority
voting and politics (Alesina and Passarelli, 2019), sectoral trade policy behavior (Tovar, 2009), and
selling-buying price endowment e￿ects in contingent valuation of nontraded goods (Ericson and
Fuster, 2014; Tunçel and Hammitt, 2014). It also features prominently in behavioral industrial
organization (Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2018).
Several di￿erent methods have been used to measure loss-aversion. These include laboratory
experiments, representative panel surveys, analyses of natural data, and randomized trials trying
to change behavior. Many studies also come from far outside economics, including neuroscience,
psychiatry, business and management, and transportation.
Given how widely the concept of loss-aversion has been applied in economics and many
other social sciences, it is useful to have the best possible empirical answer about how large loss-
aversion is, and how it varies. One of the ￿rst empirical estimates of   is reported in Tversky
and Kahneman (1992). The authors elicit the preferences of 25 graduate students from elite west-
coast American universities using three sessions of unincentivized lottery-choice experiments.
The median  —no mean nor statistic of dispersion was reported—was   = 2.25 (Figure 1). Many
analyses, to this day, cite this number as the typical degree of loss aversion. For example, the
value   = 2.25 is used in numerical simulations of prospect theory in behavioral ￿nance (e.g,
1The 1979 paper is the most widely cited empirical economics paper published from 1970-2005 (see Table 2 in Kim
et al., 2006). Note also that Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) also documented loss-aversion in a di￿erent sample







F￿￿￿￿￿ 1: An example prospect theory value function. Notes: This is the speci￿cation (3) presented in
Section 2 with median parameters in Tversky and Kahneman (1992),   = 2.25 and u+(x) = u (x) = x0.88.
Barberis et al., 2001; Barberis and Huang, 2001, 2008; Barberis and Xiong, 2009; Barberis et al.,
2016, 2020). This peculiar degree of path-dependence is not lost on these authors. As noted in
the latter study, “[...] these estimates are almost 30 years old and are based on a small number of
participants. Given that the values we assign to these parameters play a signi￿cant role in our
results, it seems prudent to base these values on a wide range of studies, not just one.” (Barberis
et al., 2020, p. 25).
What is the best way to cumulate knowledge about   after thirty years of research? Our view
is that meta-analysis is an indispensable tool for scienti￿c cumulation.
Meta-analysis is a principled, reproducible, open-science method for accumulating scienti￿c
knowledge (and also for detecting nonrandom selective reporting of evidence: Stanley, 2001;
Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). A meta-analysis uses a clearly speci￿ed method of sampling
available studies, coding evidence in a way that is compared and compiled across studies, and
summarizing both regularity and variation across studies. The idea of synthesizing evidence from
multiple studies dates back to the early 1900s (Pearson, 1904; Yates and Cochran, 1938), but the
history of modern meta-analysis has its origin in the 1976 AERA presidential address by Gene
V. Glass. He introduced the term “meta-analysis” to refer to “the statistical analysis of a large
collection of analysis results from individual studies for the purpose of integrating the ￿ndings”
(Glass, 1976, p. 3). It has been widely-used in evidence-based practices in medicine and policy for
at least a decade or two (Gurevitch et al., 2018). However, meta-analysis has been mostly absent
from highly-selective journals in empirical economics.2
2Prominent meta-analyses in economics include value of life (Doucouliagos et al., 2012, 2014), intertemporal
elasticity (Havránek, 2015; Havránek et al., 2015), habit formation (Havránek et al., 2017), foreign direct investment
(Iršová and Havránek, 2013), minimum wage e￿ects (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009), behavior in dictator and
ultimatum games (Engel, 2011; Oosterbeek et al., 2004), truth-telling (Abeler et al., 2019), experimentally-measured
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An advantage of meta-analysis is that as new evidence arrives it can be easily added to the
previous corpus of studies and results can be quickly updated. No serious science can thrive
without meta-analysis, and many results of meta-analyses should be broadcast widely.
This paper reports results of a meta-analysis of empirical estimates of loss aversion. The
dataset comprises 607 estimates reported in 150 papers in economics, psychology, neuroscience,
and several other disciplines.
The toolkit of meta-analysis can give the best available answers to three questions:
1. What is the central tendency in the distribution of   estimates; and how much do they
vary?
2. Does measured   vary systematically across di￿erent methods, de￿nition of  , utility spec-
i￿cations, domains of choice, and types of participants?
3. Is there evidence of selective reporting, or publication bias, which distorts reported esti-
mates of   compared to the corpus of ideal evidence without such biases?
The numerical answers to these questions should be intrinsically interesting for scientists
interested in loss-aversion. Beyond intrinsic interest, however, the results can help scientists do
their work better in several ways.
Imagine an early career researcher (ECR) who is interested in loss-aversion but not quite sure
what steps to take to measure it or to apply it. First, the ECR might ask: What method should
I use to measure  ? What are the most popular methods? Does it make much di￿erence which
one is used?
Results on how estimated  ’s vary with characteristics of the measurement method, such as
the type of the data (experimental or ￿eld), reward (monetary or non-monetary), speci￿cation of
the utility function, and the de￿nition of loss aversion, can guide the ECR.3
Second, the ECR may be doing a behavior change RCT. Then she needs a speci￿c estimate
of  , or a plausible range of values, to use to make a power calculation. Perhaps she is planning
to prepay teacher bonuses, which they can later lose, to motivate them to increase student test
outcomes (Fryer et al., 2012). Is   = 2.25 a good guess or is there a better guess? Is there a more
re￿ned estimate of   for the subset of studies in the meta-analysis which are most like the one
she is planning? Meta-analysis can help here too.
Third, suppose the ECRhas just read recent review articles about prospect theory and reference-
dependent preferences (e.g., Barberis, 2013; DellaVigna, 2018; O’Donoghue and Sprenger, 2018).
discount rates (Matoušek et al., 2020), and present-bias in Convex Time Budget experiments (Imai et al., forthcoming).
3These methodological variations can also help us understand the mechanisms behind loss aversion, along with









0 1 2 3 4 5 6





F￿￿￿￿￿ 2: Distribution of reported estimates of loss aversion coe￿cient.
Those reviews have a “narrative” programmatic structure in which results of early and key stud-
ies raise fundamental questions that later studies are designed to answer. The reader is usually
left with an understanding of the historical intellectual trajectory, and what the next wave of
studies should try to understand better. The ECR wonders, is anything important left out of the
narrative? The meta-analysis helps answer this question too. (However, the comparison and
complementarities of meta-analysis and narrative review are subtle and important, so we will
return to them in the conclusion.)
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the loss aversion coe￿cient   in our dataset with median
value of 1.69 and the mean of 1.97. The distribution is right-skewed and has a substantial mass
(93.9%) on the range   > 1, corresponding to loss aversion (as opposed to loss tolerance,   < 1).
Applying a Bayesian hierarchical approach taking into account the uncertainty surrounding the
measurements, we ￿nd that the average   in the literature lies between 1.7 and 1.9. Taking into
account the fact that many papers reported more than one estimate (thus producing correlation
among estimates), the average is between 1.8 and 2.1. We also examine whether observed het-
erogeneity in reported   can be attributed to some of the observable characteristics of the study
design. The results do not show many strong reliable e￿ects.
Even to economists unfamiliar with meta-analysis, the method should be appealing. It is
essentially an application of some special econometrics to literature review (see Stanley and
Doucouliagos, 2012). Like any empirical study, the greatest concern should be the inclusion crite-
ria of the dataset (i.e., selection). While our broad inclusion criteria are independent of estimates
of  , we have little control over publication decisions (which makes papers more prominent and
easier to ￿nd) and whether a study is written at all (i.e., “the ￿le drawer problem”; Rosenthal,
5
1979), which could be dependent on the values of estimated  . We use funnel plots to consider
these issues and how they might a￿ect our analysis. As noted elsewhere, no technique, not even
the alternative narrative review, can address this issues perfectly (Borenstein et al., 2009). Meta-
analysis at least has the tools to examine these possible issues analytically.
Related papers. There are two previousmeta-analyses of loss aversion, towhichwe contribute
a newer and broader scope. Neumann and Böckenholt (2014) conduct a meta-analysis of 109
estimates of loss aversion from 33 studies about consumer brand choice. As we do later in this
paper, they use a multi-level, random-e￿ects technique to account for variability of estimates,
both within and between studies, of the logged-  parameter. They report a base model   = 1.49
and an “enhancedmodel”   = 1.73 accounting for sources of estimate variability. Perhaps because
of their narrow focus on consumer choice, their meta-regression controls explain nearly all of the
variability within their data. Notably, the use of external vs. internal reference points, estimates
derived from models that account for both heterogeneity in taste and process, and unpublished
vs. published studies all lead to lower loss aversion.
A di￿erent approach was used by Walasek et al. (2018). Their analysis used only published
experimental studies of mixed lotteries of gains and losses where original raw data were available
for reanalysis. Their corpus is 19 estimates from 17 articles.4 Rather than meta-analyzing esti-
mates from the original papers, they re-estimated parameters for a single model of cumulative
prospect theory (i.e., power utility function with symmetric curvature,   =   , see equation (4) in
Section 2) using the original data. Their random-e￿ects meta-analysis on the 19 estimates has an
average   = 1.31, which is substantially smaller than the one found in the current paper. Despite
their rather strict restrictions, the authors note that there are high levels of variability between
studies (the data is not conducive to looking at this question within studies) in both estimates
and procedures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of loss aversion.
Section 3 describes howwe assembled the dataset of empirical estimates of loss aversion. Section 4
provides results and Section 5 discusses their implications.
4Though not speci￿cally excluded by the aforementioned criteria, the authors also excluded studies that relied
on adaptive questions because of concerns about how such techniques would a￿ect their maximum likelihood esti-
mation procedures (i.e., Abdellaoui et al., 2008; Wakker and Dene￿e, 1996).
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2 Conceptual Framework
We consider a situationwhere an agent makes a choice under risk between prospects with at most
two distinct outcomes. This simpli￿ed structure still captures a wide range of empirical studies
examined here. Let L = (x,p; ) denote a simple lottery which gives outcome x with probability
p and outcome   with probability 1   p. A key assumption of prospect theory is that outcomes
are evaluated as gains and losses relative to a reference point. For simplicity of exposition, in
this section, we assume the reference point to be 0, so that the sign of the outcome indicates
whether it is a gain or a loss. We call a lottery non-mixed if two outcomes have the same sign (i.e.,
either x,  > 0 or x,  < 0) and mixed if one of the outcomes is positive and the other outcome
is negative. Without loss of generality, we assume that x > 0 >   when we deal with a mixed
lottery.
In this setup, both original prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (hereafter OPT)
and its modern incarnation, cumulative prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (here-
after PT), postulate that the agent evaluates non-mixed prospects L = (x,p; ) with x,  > 0 or
x,  < 0 as





and mixed prospects L = (x,p; ) with x > 0 >   as
V (L) = w+(p) ⇥ (x) +w (1   p) ⇥ ( ), (2)
wherewi : [0, 1] ! [0, 1] is a probability weighting function for gains (i = +) or for losses (i =  ),
withwi(0) = 0 andwi(1) = 1. Note thatw+ = w  is assumed under OPT.
In the literature (both empirical and applied-theoretical), the de￿nition of the value function




u+(x) if x   0
  u ( x) if x < 0
, (3)
where   is a positive constant, u+ : R+ ! R and u  : R+ ! R are both monotonically increasing
and u+(0) = u (0) = 0. The parameter   is the loss aversion coe￿cient, the target variable of
interest in this study. Notice that mixed prospects are necessary to identify loss aversion, since  
cancels out in evaluation of pure-loss prospects such as in equation (1).
There are several de￿nitions of loss aversion proposed in the literature. Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s (1979) notion of loss aversion is that the agent prefers a lottery ( , 0.5;  ) over (x, 0.5; x)
if x >     0 (i.e., the value function for losses is steeper than the value function for gains). The
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OPT value function gives us
 (x) + ( x) <  ( ) + (  ) ()  (x)   ( ) <  (  )   ( x).




is greater than one for all x > 0.
Under PT, decision weights naturally enter the de￿nition of loss aversion (Schmidt and Zank,
2005). Suppose an agent is indi￿erent between a mixed lottery L = (x,p; ) with x > 0 >   and a
sure outcome of 0. Then, from equations (2) and (3), we have
w+(p) ⇥ u+(x)    w (1   p) ⇥ u (  ) = 0 ()   = w
+(p)
w (1   p) ⇥
u+(x)
u (  ) .
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) take the ratio of the utility of a loss of one monetary unit and
a gain of one monetary unit,  TK =   (1)/ (1). This de￿nition is motivated from the power
speci￿cation they used: value function (3) together with u+(x) = x  and u (x) = x  . Köbberling
and Wakker (2005) take the ratio of the left and the right derivatives of   at the reference point,
 KW = limx%0 0(x)/limx&0 0(x) (whichwas informally introduced in Benartzi and Thaler, 1995).
Wakker and Tversky’s (1993) de￿nition of loss aversion requires that the slope of the utility func-
tion at any loss outcome is larger than the slope at the equal-sized gain:  0( x) >  0(x) for all
x > 0. Finally, Neilson (2002) de￿nes (weak) loss aversion by   (x)/x >  ( )/  for all positive
x,  > 0, which does not give us a straightforward de￿nition of the loss aversion coe￿cient.
A particularly popular functional apparatus is the one using di￿erent power utility parameters




x  if x   0
  ( x)  if x < 0
. (4)
In this formulation, the loss aversion parameter is dependent on the scale of the data, and thus not
uniquely de￿ned due to scaling issues (seeWakker, 2010, Section 9.6, for a theoretical discussion).
If, on the other hand, the two power parameters are assumed to be identical, i.e.   =   , this issue
does not occur. It also does not occur for di￿erent utility parameters using alternative functional
forms, such as exponential utility (Köbberling and Wakker, 2005).
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3 Data
3.1 Identi￿cation and Selection of Relevant Studies
In order to deliver an unbiased meta-analysis, we ￿rst identi￿ed and selected relevant papers fol-
lowing unambiguously speci￿ed inclusion criteria. The main criterion is to include “all empirical
papers that estimate a coe￿cient of loss aversion.” Note that, under this criterion, we include
papers that use choice data from laboratory or ￿eld experiments and also non-experimental, nat-
urally occurring data including stock prices, TV game shows, and surveys on transportation.
We searched for relevant papers on the scienti￿c citation indexing database Web of Science.
The initial search, made in the summer of 2017, returned a total hits of 1,547 papers. As a ￿rst
step of paper identi￿cation, we went through titles and abstracts and threw out 910 papers that
were clearly irrelevant for our study. We then read the remaining papers, applied our inclusion
criteria based on the content, and then coded information (described in Section 3.2 below). We
also used IDEAS/RePEc and Google Scholar to search for unpublished working papers. Finally,
we posted a message on the email list of the Economic Science Association to ask for relevant
papers (in February 2018).
In the initial search phase, we cast a net also to identify papers that estimate the degree
of loss aversion in riskless choices, through measuring the discrepancy between willingness-
to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA). However, in reading many of these papers, we
discovered that while the authors had measured WTP and WTA for a given item, they had not
intended to do so as a way to estimate the loss aversion coe￿cient. While it is straightforward to
impose a certain linear utility structure on such papers, we viewed it as problematic to impose our
own assumptions on the work of others, and thus, faced with no better option, did not included
these papers.
The search and selection procedure is summarized in Online Appendix A.1. We identi￿ed 150
papers at the end of this process. Twenty papers are unpublished at the time of the initial data
collection (summer 2017).
3.2 Data Construction
We assembled the dataset for our meta-analysis by coding relevant information—estimates of the
loss aversion coe￿cient, characteristics of the data, and measurement methods. The primary
variable of interests are estimates of the loss aversion coe￿cient  . These estimates come in
two di￿erent forms: (i) aggregate-level, where a single   for the “representative” agent/subject is
estimated by pooling data from all subjects in a study; (ii) individual-level, where   is estimated
for each subject in a study and the summary statistics of empirical distribution, typically mean or
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median, are reported. We have a dummy variable capturing the type of reported estimates. We
also coded standard errors (SEs) of parameter estimates in order to control simply for the quality
of the study/uncertainty surrounding any given estimate in the meta-analysis. When SEs are not
reported, we reconstructed them from other available information such as standard deviation
(SD), p-value (of the null hypothesis of loss neutrality), or the inter-quartile range (IQR).5
We also coded variables describing characteristics of the data and measurement methods.
These variables include: type of the data (e.g., experimental, non-experimental, TV game show);
location of the experiment (e.g., laboratory, ￿eld, online); types of reward (e.g., real or hypotheti-
cal, money, health, time); subject population (e.g., children, college students, general population,
farmers); de￿nition of loss aversion coe￿cient; utility speci￿cation; and several others. Table A.1
in the Online Appendix lists all variables coded in the study.
The set of papers we included span a wide range of disciplines (see Table A.3 in the Online
Appendix). Since ￿elds/journals have di￿erent reporting cultures and standards, we could not
always retrieve all the necessary information from reading papers. We thus emailed the authors
of the papers when some essential summary statistics of the loss aversion coe￿cient or sample
size information were missing.6
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
We identi￿ed 150 articles that report an estimate of the loss aversion coe￿cient   (see Online
Appendix E for the full list of articles). Among these, 130 articles were published in 78 journal
outlets (including eight articles published in the “Top 5” journals in economics). The dataset
includes papers from a variety of disciplines: economics, management, psychology, neuroscience,
medicine, psychiatry, agriculture, environment, transportation, and operations research (see the
list of journals and their classi￿cations in Table A.2 in the Online Appendix).
We also identi￿ed where the data (either experimental or survey) were collected for 147 arti-
cles in the dataset. Most of these articles report estimates from data collected in a single country.
Ten of them collected data from two to three countries/regions, and three of them (l’Haridon and
Vieider, 2019; Rieger et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017) conducted large-scale cross-country studies,
5We calculated/approximated 68 SEs from other available information: 64 from IQR and sample size and four from
p-values. Use of the IQR to infer the SE of the mean (from an approximation of the standard deviation, SD ⇡ 1.35 ⇥
IQR) is in principle only legitimate if the parameters are normally distributed in the population. That assumption is
clearly a stretch. Nevertheless, obtaining even an “approximated” SE seemed preferable to dropping the observation
entirely, or to making other, even stronger, assumptions allowing us to keep the observation.
6We contacted the authors of 51 papers asking for additional clari￿cation on 175 estimates (i.e., mean, SE, or
number of obs). If the authors did not respond to our initial request, we sent an additional email. Overall, we
received 39 responses. Of those, 28 responses were ultimately useful and we recovered additional information on 78
estimates. The remainder had to be imputed.
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T￿￿￿￿ 1: Study characteristics.
Freq. %
Total number of studies 185 100.0
Data type
Lab experiment 98 53.0
Field experiment 29 15.7
Other ￿eld data 20 10.8
Classroom experiment 18 9.7
Online experiment 17 9.2
Game show 3 1.6
Subject population























South America 6 3.2
Multiple 3 1.6
Notes: In two studies, the geographic location of the data is unknown. These studies were run online
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk or a mobile app, and the authors did not specify what geographic
controls were used.
collecting data from more than 30 countries/regions. In total, the estimates of the loss aversion
coe￿cient comprised in our dataset come from 71 countries/regions (Figure C.1 in the Online
Appendix).
Next we look at the basic design characteristics of the studies. We have 185 “studies” reported
in 150 papers, where a study is de￿ned by a combination of several variables: type of the data,
location of data collection, subject pool, type of reward, and continent of data collection. The
frequency of each design characteristic is shown in Table 1.
The majority of our data comes from laboratory experiments, but we also have studies using
non-experimental data such as surveys, stockmarket data, and game shows. Subjects weremostly
recruited from the pool of university students or the general population. There is also a small
set of studies which recruited special populations such as ￿nancial professionals, entrepreneurs,
managers, and patients with psychiatric disorders or gambling problems. The type of reward
used in the studies is mostly monetary. About three-quarters of the studies were conducted in
Europe or North America.
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T￿￿￿￿ 2: Types of estimates.
All estimates With SE
Freq. Prop. Freq. Prop.
Aggregate-level 286 0.471 225 0.542
Individual-level mean 159 0.262 125 0.301
Individual-level median 162 0.267 65 0.157
Total 607 1.000 415 1.000
Notes: There are 85 cases where both mean and median of the distribution of individual-level estimates
are reported. “With SE” indicates the observations where SEs are available. In addition, there are four
aggregate-level estimates for which SEs are approximated with reported p-values, and 64 individual-level
medians for which SEs are approximated with IQR. SEs are imputed for the rest of 124 observations (see
Section 4.2).
Next, we look at the main variable of interest, the estimated coe￿cient of loss aversion. We
have a total of 607 estimates in the dataset (Table 2). About half of these estimate the degree of
loss aversion of a “representative” subject by pooling data from all subjects together (we call these
aggregate-level, or simply aggregate, estimates). The other half estimated the coe￿cient for each
individual subject in the study and reported summary statistics of the distribution, either mean
or median. There are 85 cases where we have both the mean and the median of the distribution
of the loss aversion coe￿cients estimated at the individual level.
Finally, we look at the speci￿cation of the functional form and the de￿nition of loss aversion  
(Table 3). There are 302 observations which assume the CRRA form for the basic utility functions
u+ and u  as in equation (4), following Tversky and Kahneman (1992), but 190 of them assume
and estimate the common curvature for gains and losses (  =  ). We observe less variation
in the speci￿cation of reference points and the de￿nition of loss aversion coe￿cients. Three-
quarters of the observations set the reference point at zero, but our dataset also includes studies
where reference points are assumed to be subjects’ status quo or expectations. More than 80% of
the observations estimate the loss aversion coe￿cient   as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) de￿ne
(equation (3)).
4 Results
We structure the results into three distinct parts. We start from a non-parametric analysis of
the reported loss aversion coe￿cients and their SEs. We subsequently ￿t random-e￿ects meta-
analytic distributions to the data, and document the estimated mean and median loss aversion.
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T￿￿￿￿ 3: Utility speci￿cation.
Freq. %






Not reported 28 5.4
Reference point
Zero 394 75.5
Status quo 60 11.5
Expectation 18 3.4
Other / Not reported 50 9.6
Freq. %




Other parametric 32 6.1
Nonparametric 16 3.1
Not reported 46 8.8
Notes: There are 85 cases where both mean and median of the distribution of individual-level estimates are
reported. We keep only one measure from each of these observations.
Finally, we conduct a series ofmeta-regressions to see towhat extent we can explain the estimated
between-study variance.
4.1 Nonparametric Analysis
We start our presentation of the results by showing some non-parametric patterns in the reported
loss aversion coe￿cient  . Since we do not need SEs for this analysis, we can make use of all the
estimates of loss aversion we coded in the dataset. Figure 3A shows the distribution of all the
encoded loss aversion parameters. The mean of the parameters is 1.97. Given the right skew in
the distribution, the median is considerably lower than the mean, at 1.69.
Figure 3B shows the same estimates, but nowplots separate density functions for the estimates
obtained from aggregate-level means (N = 286), individual-level means (N = 159), and medians
(N = 162). Aggregate-level estimates can be seen to have the lowest mode (around 1.36), with
individual-level medians having a slightly higher mode around 1.89. Means of individual-level
estimates show a fat right tail, indicating a higher frequency of larger values. Table 4 shows
summary statistics of reported   for each type of measurement. The means of aggregate-level
estimates and individual-level medians are close together, at 1.96 and 1.83, respectively. The
somewhat lower mean of the latter results from fewer very large observations amongst medians
than amongst aggregate estimates. The individual-level means have the largest variation (SD =
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 3: Distribution of loss aversion parameters. (A) All reported estimates combined. (B) Separated
by the type of estimates. Notes: There are 85 cases that report both individual-level mean and median.
We keep individual-level medians from these cases in panel A, while panel B includes all 607 estimates in
the data. The x-axis is cut o￿ at 6 for better visual rendering. In the Online Appendix, Figure C.3 shows
density plots of log( ) and Figure C.4 shows the empirical CDF of   for each type of estimates.
T￿￿￿￿ 4: Summary statistics of reported  .
Type N Mean SD Q25 Median Q75 Min Max
Aggregate-level 286 1.955 1.667 1.280 1.545 2.214 0.040 23.460
Individual-level mean 159 2.945 2.610 1.625 2.180 3.420 0.110 19.861
Individual-level median 162 1.829 0.759 1.404 1.800 2.000 0.110 7.500
All 607 2.181 1.857 1.340 1.790 2.375 0.040 23.460
Notes: There are 85 cases that report both individual-level mean and median.
the smallest estimates as well as some of the largest. The truncated nature of the distribution
then results in the highest mean by far, 2.95.
The di￿erences between measurement types above cannot be interpreted causally. That is,
the di￿erent measurements generally derive from di￿erent studies and are based on di￿erent
data, so that the observed di￿erences cannot be directly ascribed to the type of measurement
used. To gain insight into the e￿ect of measurement type, we can conduct an analysis based on
the 85 studies for which both means and medians are reported. With a mean of the means of 3.47
(median of means 2.08) and a mean of the medians of 1.71 (median of medians 1.69), the results
con￿rm the ones for the overall sample (see Figure C.5 in the Online Appendix). That is, the
individual-level estimates tend to be rightward skewed, and this strongly a￿ects the aggregate
estimate reported in a paper when means of the individual-level estimates are used instead of
medians. This issue, however, will be at least partly remedied by the observation that means
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of individual-level estimates also tend to come with increased SEs, which will in turn lead to
increased pooling of the larger estimates in our meta-analytic estimations.
The earliest evidence recorded in our dataset is Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) famous 2.25
(see Figure C.2 in the Online Appendix for the time trend of reported estimates). Half of the
estimates in the data are found in papers published after 2015. Individual-level estimates appear
in the dataset after 2006, in part due to the rise of common experimental elicitation procedures.
The raw data do not reveal a clear time trend, suggesting that estimates have remained the same
on average for the last 30 years.
Just looking at the raw reported  , Figure 3 and Table 4 suggest that the “average” loss aver-
sion coe￿cient   would locate somewhere between 1.8 and 2.9. At the same time, there is high
dispersion in the reported  . These rough initial estimates, however, do not take the quality of
the estimate into account. The latter can be assessed objectively by means of the standard error
associated to each estimate, which we can use to calculate a proper “meta-analytic average” by
weighing each estimate by the inverse of its standard error. Estimates falling far from the mean
will then be given less weight to the extent that they have large associated standard errors.
4.2 Precision of Estimates
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between reported estimates and their associated SEs using
data points where we have both a value for   and an associated SE (either reported in the paper
or re-constructed from other available information by us).
Figure 4 tells us several things about empirical estimates of loss aversion. Loss aversion may
be imprecisely estimated, for instance, because of a small sample size, or because of other char-
acteristics of the design. In our data, estimates that are far from 1 have higher SEs. They are not
precisely estimated coe￿cients due to, for example, small sample size or other issues with the
design or behavior. More precisely estimated  ’s tend to cluster between 1 and 2. Second, 398 out
of 419 estimates (95%) are (weakly) larger than 1, producing a massive asymmetry in the funnel
plot. Third, about 76.6% (305 out of 398) of     1 estimates report results that are statistically
signi￿cantly di￿erent from 1 (two-sided Wald test with a signi￿cance level of 0.05).
Table 2 above shows that 192 out of our 607 recorded estimates are missing SEs. We approx-
imate SEs from IQRs and p-values for 68 of these observations (footnote 5), which leave 124 SEs
missing. Since standard errors are a fundamental ingredient for meta-analysis because they pro-
vide weights for the observations, we thus risk losing many observations, including the iconic
measure of 2.25 reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). If studies not reporting any SEs are
di￿erent from studies reporting them, we may furthermore distort our estimates systematically.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 4: Relationship between reported   and associated SE. Estimates with corresponding SEs reported
are included (n = 419). Notes: For observations which have both individual-level mean and median, we
keep the median in this ￿gure. The vertical solid line corresponds to no loss aversion   = 1. Two dashed
curves represent the boundaries for statistically-signi￿cant loss aversion/tolerance (  , 1). The x-axis is
cut o￿ at 6 and the  -axis is displayed in the log-scale for better visualization.
both   and its associated SE. See Online Appendix A.2 for the detail of SE imputation. We will,
from now on, make use of the full set of observations.
4.3 Average Loss Aversion in the Literature
The main goal of our meta-analysis is ￿rst to obtain the “best available” estimate of the loss aver-
sion coe￿cient   combining the available information in the literature and then to understand
the heterogeneity of reported estimates across studies. To this end, we analyze the data using a
Bayesian hierarchical modeling approach.
Setup. Consider the dataset ( i, se2i )mi=1, where  i is the ith measurement (or observation) of the
loss aversion coe￿cient in the dataset and sei is the associated standard error that captures the
uncertainty surrounding the estimate. In the benchmark model, we assume that the ith reported
estimate  i is normally distributed around the parameter  i :
 i |  i, sei ⇠ N( i, se2i ), (5)
where the variability is due to the sampling variation captured by the known standard error sei .7
7The parameter  i is often referred to as the “true e￿ect size” in the random-e￿ects meta-analysis.
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Sampling variation is part of the observed variation in the reported estimates ( i)mi=1, but it
may not be all, since there is a possibility of “genuine” heterogeneity across measurements (due to
di￿erent settings, for example). We model this by assuming that each  i is normally distributed,
adding another level to the hierarchy:
 i |  0,   ⇠ N( 0,   2), (6)
where  0 is the overall mean of the estimated loss aversion parameters  i , and   is its standard
deviation, capturing the variation between observations in the data. The overall variance in the
data, therefore, consists of two parts, the between-observation variance,   2, and the individual
sampling variation coming from measurement uncertainty, se2. This can be clearly seen by com-
bining expressions (5) and (6) into one:
 i |  0,   , sei ⇠ N( 0,   2 + se2i ).
Model estimation. We start from ￿tting the model expressed as equations (5) and (6), re-stated
as model M1 here, to the data:
 i |  i, sei ⇠ N( i, se2i ),
 i |  0,   ⇠ N( 0,   2),
 0 ⇠ half N(1, 5),
  ⇠ half N(0, 5),
(M1)
where “half N” indicates a normal distribution folded at 0 to exclude non-permissible negative
values.8 This model incorporates the assumption that every observation is statistically inde-
pendent, and that the observations are normally distributed. We later relax these rather strong
assumptions.
The estimated overall mean  0 is 1.810 with a 95% credible interval (CrI) of [1.742, 1.880].9,10
The mean is clearly and signi￿cantly lower than the non-parametric result that we saw above,
8We estimate the model in Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017) using the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo simulations, an
algorithm for Markov Chain Monte Carlo, and launch it from R (https://www.r-project.org/) using RStan (Stan
Development Team, 2020). Priors for the population-level parameters are chosen in such a way as to be mildly
regularizing, i.e., they are informative, but typically encompass ranges that are one order of magnitude larger than
the estimated values we expect based on the range of the data (McElreath, 2016).
9A Bayesian credible interval (CrI) of size 1     given data D is an interval [L(D),U (D)] such that Pr[L(D)    
U (D)] = 1     , where   is the parameter of interest. Unlike the (frequentist) con￿dence interval, CrI has a literal
probabilistic interpretation: given the data, there is a 100 ⇥ (1    )% probability that the true parameter value is in
the interval.
10Results from the “classical” (frequentist) random-e￿ects meta-analysis are presented in Online Appendix D. We
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 5: (A) Density plot of loss aversion coe￿cient, estimated  i versus reported  i . (B) Posterior draws
of the overall mean  0. (C) Posterior draws of the heterogeneity parameter   . Notes: The dashed curve
in panel A indicates the density of the observed loss aversion parameters,  i ; the solid curve in panel A
indicates the density of the estimated parameters,  i . Observations above six are not shown in panel A for
better visualization. The black dots and lines in panels B and C represent the posterior means and the 95%
credible intervals of  0 and   , respectively.
which was 1.965. This is shown in Figure 5AB. The density of estimated  i is lower than the
one of observed  i for values above 2.5. The same occurs for values below one. This is meta-
analytic pooling at work—estimates that fall far from themean are shrunk towards more plausible
values, with the amount of shrinkage proportional to the standard error. See discussion in Online
Appendix B.2.
The estimates produced are of course only valid conditional on our assumptions. We already
know that the normality assumption seems a stretch, given the skewed distribution of the re-
ported  . To see this, we can take a look at the posterior predictive distribution—the distribution
of loss aversion coe￿cients we would expect new observations  new to display, provided that the
characteristics of the studies fromwhich these observations are obtained are similar on average to
those of past studies—and compare it to the distribution of actual observations.11 This is shown in
Figure 6A. Relatively to the actual observations—either as reported ( i ), or as estimated ( i )—the
posterior predictive distribution overestimates the likelihood of values smaller than 1, while it
underestimates the likelihood of intermediate values between 1 and 2. It does not attribute any
11Formally, the posterior predictive distribution is written:
 
 




  ( new |   ) 
 
  | ( i )mi=1
 
d ,
where   = (( i )mi=1,  0,   ) is a vector of model parameters (Gelman et al., 2014). Evaluating this integral is di￿cult,
but we approximate it by drawing  (s)new ⇠ N( (s)0 ,   2(s)) using posterior simulations ( 
(s)
0 ,  (s)), s = 1, . . . ,N . We have
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 6: Distributions of reported and estimated  , and posterior predictive distribution of  . (A) Assum-
ing a normal distribution for the population level (model M1). (B) Assuming a log-normal distribution for
the population level (model M2).
probability to values beyond 4, which are not uncommon in the data. It thus seems desirable to
look for a model that may provide a better ￿t to the data.
We now extend the baseline model M1 in two ways. First, we use a log-normal distribution
for the population-level distribution. Second, we explicitly model the nesting of observations
in papers, in order to overcome any potential distortions deriving from non-independence of
observations. Remember that our 607 observations have been obtained from 150 distinct papers,
the largest number of observations in a single paper being 53 (Rieger et al., 2017; Wang et al.,
2017). The independence assumption seems rather heroic in this case. To do this, we introduce
paper-level estimates as an additional hierarchical level. Let  pi be the ith estimate reported in
paper p. We formulate a model as follows:
 pi |  pi, sepi ⇠ N( pi, se2pi),
 pi | df ,  p, p ⇠ t(df ,  p,  2p ),
 p |  `0,  ` ⇠ logN( `0,   2` ),
 `0 ⇠ N(1, 5),
 ` ⇠ half N(0, 5),
df ⇠ half N(0, 5),
 p ⇠ half N(0, 5).
(M2)
The system M2 now explicitly models the nesting of the estimated observation-level param-
eters,  pi , in paper-level estimates,  p . The former are modeled as following a robust student-t
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T￿￿￿￿ 5: Summary of estimation results.
Distributional assumption Posterior of  0 Posterior of  
Model Obs. level Paper level Pop. level Mean SD 2.5% 97.5% Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
M1 Normal Normal 1.810 0.036 1.741 1.880 0.747 0.027 0.695 0.801
M2 Normal Student-t Log-normal 1.955 0.072 1.824 2.104 0.743 0.342 0.605 0.907
Notes: In Model M2, ( 0,   ) are calculated from the log-normal parameters ( `0,  `) by  0 = exp( `0 +   2` /2)
and   2 = [exp(  2` )   1] exp(2 `0 +   2` ).
distribution instead of a normal distribution to account for observed outliers.12 The latter are
modeled as following a log-normal distribution. Note the super-/sub-scripts ` in the location and
scale parameters ( `0,   2` ) of the log-normal distribution. We can calculate the mean and the me-
dian of the distribution by exp( `0 +   2` /2) and exp( `0), respectively. The mean of the log-normal
distribution is given by  0 ⌘ exp( `0 +   2` /2).
We again start by examining the￿t of themodel to the data, and by summarizing the population-
level parameters. The model ￿t is shown in Figure 6B. The log-normal distribution can now be
seen to ￿t the estimated paper-level data well. The distribution of the paper-level observations
has more probability mass between about 1 and 3, but less beyond that point, compared to the ac-
tual study-level observations. The degrees of freedom of the student-t distribution are estimated
at 1.32, thus vindicating the use of the robust distribution. The mean loss aversion parameter ob-
tained from this estimation is 1.955, with a 95% CrI of [1.824, 2.104]. Notice, however, that even
though this estimate is virtually identical to the one obtained under the standard model at the
outset, that occurs by coincidence rather than being a feature of the model. One can further see
that there is now increased uncertainty surrounding the prediction interval. This is indeed natu-
ral, since the paper-level estimates are surrounded themselves by larger amounts of uncertainty,
which is then passed up the hierarchy to the aggregate parameters.
Robustness checks. Online Appendix B.2 presents estimation results for two additional mod-
els, but our preferred model M2 ￿ts better than these “intermediate” models. We also estimated
the models under di￿erent priors or using the “complete” data including only observations where
associated SEs are available, and obtained similar conclusions. These robustness checks are pre-
sented in Online Appendix B.3.
12We estimate the degrees of freedom of the distribution, df , endogenously from the data. This allows us to
determine whether the student-t distribution provides a good ￿t, which is the case if the degrees of freedom are




We observe a non-negligible amount of between-paper heterogeneity (expressed in estimated  
in Table 5, model M2) among reported estimates of  . In this section, we seek to understand the
source of this variability in order to provide a tentative answer to our second key question: “Do
reported estimates of   systematically vary by underlying design characteristics for measurement
of loss aversion?”
Remember that we coded several features about the characteristics of study design (Table A.1
in Online Appendix). Figure C.8 provides a ￿rst look into how these features are related to re-
ported estimates of  . Each panel presents how the reported   varies by underlying design char-
acteristics. We do observe some patterns in the ￿gure, but the e￿ects appear rather weak and it
is not clear if these relations are systematic and robust.
We approach this question with a random-e￿ects meta-regression, which extends our previous
random-e￿ects model by incorporating coded features of the observation or the paper into the
model. More precisely, we set up a new model, which expands model M2 by allowing for the
location of the observations to be systematically shifted depending on observed characteristics
of the observation or the paper. The model looks as follows:
 pi |  pi, sepi ⇠ N( pi, se2pi),
 pi | df ,  p, p,   ⇠ t(df ,  p + Xpi ,  2p ),
 p |  `0,  ` ⇠ logN( `0,   2` ),
 `0 ⇠ N(1, 5),
 ` ⇠ half N(0, 5),
df ⇠ half N(0, 5),
 p ⇠ half N(0, 5),
where Xpi is a vector of study characteristics associated with ith observation reported in paper p.
These characteristics consist mostly of dummy variables taking the value of 0 or 1, with   a
vector of coe￿cients. To facilitate the interpretation of the constant, non-dummy independent
variables included in vectorXpi are mean-centered—each coe￿cient in the vector   then captures
the additive e￿ect on the paper-level mean  p , relative to the “baseline study” (characterized by
the omitted categories in dummy variables and the means of non-dummy variables) which will
become clear later.
Estimation results are presented in Figure 7. First, the posterior mean of the estimated  p⇤ for
the benchmark study p⇤ is 1.991 (SD = 0.211, 95% CrI = [1.577, 2.420]). Each estimated coe￿cient
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 7: Bayesian random-e￿ects meta-regression. Posterior distributions of coe￿cients   , together with
posterior medians (black dot), 66% (thick solid line) and 95% (thin solid line) credible intervals, are shown.
Table C.1 in the Online Appendix presents the result in a table format.
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As we see above in Section 4.1, the type of estimates reliably captures the variation in re-
ported  — individual-level means tend to be higher than the other two types of estimates, due to
skewed distributions of individually-estimated  . We also ￿nd that ￿eld experiments are associ-
ated with higher   compared to laboratory experiments and studies recruiting general population
samples are also associated with higher values of   compared to the studies with a population of
university students. We do not observe di￿erences between studies using monetary rewards and
non-monetary rewards, but survey studies tend to produce lower estimates of   than the binary
lottery choice tasks which are common in laboratory experiments. In terms of the speci￿cation
of the value function, it does not seem to matter much which functional form (CRRA, CARA, etc.)
one assumes for the basic utility functionsu+ andu , or whether reference points are assumed to
be zero, status quo, or expectations. Studies estimating   following the de￿nition by Köbberling
and Wakker (2005) produce higher   compared to the standard Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992)
de￿nition, but the e￿ect is modest.
Taken together, our Bayesian meta-regression analysis uncovers some factors that are asso-
ciated with the size of reported loss aversion coe￿cients, but it is still a di￿cult task to draw a
complete picture of the observed heterogeneity. We note that 14.4% of the between observation
variance is explained by covariates.
4.5 Publication Bias
The cumulation of scienti￿c knowledge is threatened by selective reporting or publication of
￿ndings. When a theory makes a strong prediction about the sign or magnitude of a certain
e￿ect and the literature takes such e￿ects to be the norm, then new studies that ￿nd “unusual”
results may not be written up at all, may not be reported in papers, and academic journals may be
reluctant to publish papers into which such estimates are included. We will refer to such selective
reporting of scienti￿c ￿ndings collectively as “publication bias”.
In the context of loss aversion, one might suspect that researchers preferentially report evi-
dence for loss aversion (    1) and put evidence for loss tolerance (  < 1) “in the ￿le drawer”
because such results contradict the initial hypothesis. Other hypotheses are, however, possible,
for instance because researchers in some disciplines may be motivated to attack the “prevailing
paradigm” of loss aversion, or because some journals may be interested in publishing results that
conform to the economic orthodoxy of no loss aversion. Even coming up with a null hypothesis
is thus more complex in our case than it would be when trying to simply ascertain the e￿ect of a
treatment or its absence.
A tool often used to detect publication bias are funnel plots (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012).
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 8: Funnel plot. Notes: The vertical dotted line corresponds to no loss aversion   = 1. The vertical
solid line corresponds to the estimated mean  0 from model M2, 1.955. The x-axis is cut o￿ at 6 and the
 -axis is displayed in the log-scale for better visualization.
shows such a plot for all data points for which we have both an estimate of loss aversion and an
associated standard error (thus excluding estimates with imputed SEs). In the absence of bias, we
would expect the observations at the bottom of the graph to be concentrated around the mean
estimate, indicated by the solid vertical line. As we move up in the graph and the precision of the
studies decreases, we would then expect an increase in the degree of dispersion. In the absence
of publication bias, this dispersion ought to be symmetric around the mean. A larger number of
observations in the upper right side of the graph compared to the upper left side would then be
an indicator of classical publication bias, whereby estimates of loss aversion that fall closer to 1
and are not signi￿cant are less likely to be reported.
At ￿rst sight, there would indeed appear to be such an asymmetry in the graph. We clearly
observe some large estimates in the upper right part of the graph, and hardly any corresponding
estimates in the upper left part. This may, however, in part be due to di￿erences in the reported
measures. Figure 9 shows separate funnel plots for the di￿erent types of measures—aggregate
estimates, individual-levelmeans, andmedians. The asymmetry just discussed seems indeedmost
pronounced for individual-level means, as well as aggregate estimates. Median estimates tend to
show less of a bias, providing at least some indication that the observed asymmetry stems partially
from the measurement type (plotting the log of loss aversion against the precision instead does
not a￿ect any of these insights). Since the largest estimates also have the largest SEs on average,
the asymmetry shown in this graph will be at least partially taken care of by the pooling inherent
in meta-analytic estimation.
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 9: Funnel plot by the type of estimates. Vertical lines correspond to mean estimates M2 applied to
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F￿￿￿￿￿ 10: Funnel plot by the type of SEs. (A) SEs reported in the paper. (B) SEs approximated by available
information (IQR or p-value). (C) SEs imputed.
ever, is the large cluster of studies at the bottom left corner of the graph. One might be con-
cerned they indicate a model of publication bias where the true   is around 0.8–1 but editorial
bias favors publication of studies with higher estimates at lower precision. (In such a model,
low-precision, low-estimate studies would not be published because of the judgment of journal
referees or editors, and high-precision, high-estimate studies would not be published because
they are statistically improbable.) While this ￿nding would be disturbing, there are, however,
better alternative explanations. Figure 10 separates the funnel plot by how the SE of the estimate
were obtained: either directly from the paper, estimated by percentiles (e.g., IQR, median, etc.),
or imputed entirely (via number of observations and other factors, see Section 3.2). Notably, the
asymmetry is only visible in the graph where SEs are reported (panel A). Since it is not consistent
with any story of publication bias for journal editors to only be biased toward studies that report
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standard errors, it is di￿cult to reconcile this ￿gure with any story of publication bias. A more
plausible explanation is simply that the non-normality of   and the truncation of estimates at 0
mechanically induces smaller SE calculations for lower values. When researchers instead report
non-parametric measures like IQR, these high-precision estimates disappear.
Our sample of working papers is small, but it might be suggestive of a form of publication
bias, just at a much smaller magnitude. Publication bias would suggest that the estimates found
in published papers would vary from working papers. Our meta-regressions (presented in Sec-
tion 4.4) predict observed loss aversion coe￿cients to be 0.27 points lower in working papers than
in published studies, roughly about 1.7 (though the two numbers are not statistically di￿erent at
the 5% level). Even if this number were taken at face value, we must remember the “true” value
of lambda would need to be a weighted average of the working paper estimate and published
estimate, so 1.7 can still be thought of as a lower bound of the “true” estimate. Notably, it is
within the con￿dence interval of estimated lambda and much closer to our estimates than the
0.8–1 range which we dismissed above.
5 Discussion
Loss aversion is an important concept in behavioral economics and has been applied widely. This
paper reports a meta-analysis of empirical estimates of the loss aversion coe￿cient  . Our pre-
ferred speci￿cation indicates a mean   = 1.955 and a 95% credible interval of [1.824, 2.104]. Many
other speci￿cations are within 0.1–0.3 of this ￿nding and produce con￿dence intervals that do
not include 1 or 2.25. The former number is consistent with no degree of loss aversion; the latter
is an early estimate from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which seems a bit too high. While there is
a wide degree of heterogeneity across estimates, in general, no single factor emerges from meta-
regression that greatly changes estimated loss aversion. Estimates derived from non-university
populations, ￿eld experiments, and means of individual elicitations (compared to aggregates) are
correlated with a modest increase in the loss aversion parameter.
With any empirical analysis, a key concern is di￿erential selection of reported data. The
outlined criteria for inclusion in our dataset are explicit and objective; we have no reason to
believe, ex-ante, it should be correlated with our parameter of interest. However, our dataset
is dominated by published studies. To the extent that publication may vary with a reported  
parameter, our analysis may su￿er from bias.13 Because the parameter of interest here is bounded
by zero and positively skewed, it is di￿cult to use standard meta-analysis technique like funnel
13It is important to note that any research synthesis technique would su￿er from this issue, not just meta-analysis
(Borenstein et al., 2009).
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plot asymmetry (see Figure 8) and regression to measure publication bias. Nonetheless, those
techniques do not indicate a degree of bias that invalidate our general ￿ndings. An important
test of publication bias is whether unpublished working papers report reliably di￿erent results
than published ones. There appears to be a modest di￿erence; unpublished papers are about 0.28
lower (  ⇡ 1.7) which, notably, is still within the con￿dence interval of our current estimate.
In the introduction we promised to return to subtle, important comparisons between meta-
analysis and narrative review. We will do that now.
Our stance is that many readers will not know much about meta-analysis and might be skep-
tical about it, especially in comparison to the familiar style we call “narrative review.” The discus-
sion anticipates such skepticism and o￿ers counter-arguments. The unabashed goal is to advocate
for more appreciation of the underdog method of meta-analysis.
We will start with fears about narrative review. Such reviews could be in￿uenced by biases in
remembering recent (and perhaps socially-connected) salient, recently-encountered data. Meta-
analysis is a partial antidote.
There are two natural fears about meta-analysis. One is that it is somehow amistake to reduce
all research in a ￿eld to a single value or a range of numbers. The second fear is that simple
apples-to-apples comparisons across studies neglects heterogeneity of methods (see Borenstein
et al., 2009, for a history of such critiques). These fears are natural, but meta-analysis techniques
have evolved to allay such fears.
The “single number” fear is misguided because humans—including scientists—value simplic-
ity. If meta-analysis did not provide a carefully and transparently derived value (or range), re-
searchers will imagine another simpli￿ed value, one way or another. It is also often necessary
to choose some value as an input into structural models within economics, and to make power
calculations during pre-registration. Furthermore, the purpose of this or any meta-analysis is not
to simply provide one number, but to demonstrate how such numbers vary given other factors
that categorize studies, using meta-regression techniques (e.g., Figure 7). Stanley and Doucoulia-
gos (2012) reminds us that meta-regressions simply take a well-known and established technique
to understand variation in many kinds of economic data, and just apply it to the data our own
profession generates.
Next we turn to a sharper comparison between meta-analysis and narrative review. In a
narrative review, there is no explicit attempt to canvas all studies based on stated criteria. Instead,
an expert reviewer chooses studies that seem to be of especially high-quality or pivot the scienti￿c
trajectory in a useful new direction. It is similar to an historical analysis of progress in a ￿eld.
To relate the two methods, a narrative review is simply a meta-analyis with an altered subjective
weighting system. The subjective weights are judgments by the reviewer of what ￿ndings readers
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should care the most about, and the reasons why.
One analogy is to sports commentary. Meta-analysis is like a “play-by-play” analyst who
describes every action on the ￿eld with an even tone. Narrative review is like a “color analyst”
who picks out certain playswhich are unusually important and explainswhy they are special. The
color analyst adds the dramatic emphasis that the play-by-play analyst suppresses. The analogy
should make clear why both kinds of commentary are useful; the two together are better than
each one alone.14 A similar analogy is to the proud divide in newspapers between the “news”
side (meta-analysis) and “opinion” (narrative review).
A tricky, interesting question is what meta-analysis and narrative review can say about in-
￿uential “breakthrough” papers? Narrative reviews often remark on how a particular study rep-
resents a breakthrough in using new methods or presents a surprising ￿nding that should be
prioritized to be studied further. Because meta-analysis is backward-looking, it is not ideally-
equipped to identify useful breakthroughs. Because narrative review is subjective, it can look
forward and might do better.
An example is De Martino et al. (2010). They found that two patients with damage to the
amygdala area of the brain were not averse to losses at all. This is a tiny ￿nding with a large
standard error; it’s a teaspoon of water added to a swimming pool. Meta-regression is worthless
because there is no power to detect an “amygdala damage” vs. “no amygdala damage” di￿erence
if the study were added to our corpus. But despite the tiny N = 2, it is a clue that could shed
light on the fundamental mechanism underlying loss-aversion, and hence deserves further study.
Narrative reviews maymiss some opportunities to amplify such interesting studies too, but meta-
analysis will always neglect them.
We will conclude with one idea about how meta-analysis can guide future research. Meta-
regression can actually pinpoint where studies are plentiful and where an additional study would
have the greatest new e￿ect on collective knowledge. A low standard error on a meta-regression
coe￿cient means we do not need to learn more. A high standard error means that we do need
to learn more. From our dataset, studies (i) other than lab and ￿eld experiments, (ii) focusing
on speci￿c, non-University student populations, (iii) on continents of South America, Africa and
Oceania, (iv) involving rewards not expressed in monetary terms, (v) obtaining preferences in
methods other than sequential binary methods, (vi) using utility other than CRRA with equal
curvature and (vii) with loss-aversion speci￿cations other than Kahneman and Tversky are the
areas where we have uncovered the least data. Interesting new ￿ndings about the loss aversion
14Another useful analogy comes from performance evaluation in personnel economics. It is well-known Baker
et al. (1994) that objective and subjective measure of performance can be complements. Objective measures rein in
over-the-top subjective evaluation, and subjective evaluations can add in idiosyncratic information that objective
measures are blind to.
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parameter are ex ante more likely to be in those areas. We encourage future research there.
References
A￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, M., H. B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ O. ￿’H￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2008): “A Tractable Method to Measure
Utility and Loss Aversion under Prospect Theory,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 36, 245–
266.
A￿￿￿￿￿, J., D. N￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ C. R￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2019): “Preferences for Truth-Telling,” Econometrica,
87, 1115–1153.
A￿￿￿￿￿￿, A. ￿￿￿ F. P￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2019): “Loss Aversion in Politics,” American Journal of Political
Science, 63, 936–947.
B￿￿￿￿, G., R. G￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ K. J. M￿￿￿￿￿ (1994): “Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal
Incentive Contracts,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1125–1156.
B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, N. ￿￿￿ M. H￿￿￿￿ (2001): “Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Individual Stock
Returns,” The Journal of Finance, 56, 1247–1292.
——— (2008): “Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of Probability Weighting for Security Prices,”
American Economic Review, 98, 2066–2100.
B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, N., M.H￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿T. S￿￿￿￿￿ (2001): “Prospect Theory andAsset Prices,” TheQuarterly
Journal of Economics, 116, 1–53.
B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, N., L. J￿￿, ￿￿￿ B. W￿￿￿ (2020): “Prospect Theory and Stock Market Anomalies,” NBER
Working Paper No. 27155.
B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, N., A. M￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ B. W￿￿￿ (2016): “Prospect Theory and Stock Returns: An
Empirical Test,” The Review of Financial Studies, 29, 3068–3107.
B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, N. ￿￿￿W. X￿￿￿￿ (2009): “What Drives the Disposition E￿ect? An Analysis of a Long-
Standing Preference-Based Explanation,” The Journal of Finance, 64, 751–784.
B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, N. C. (2013): “Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assess-
ment,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27, 173–96.
B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, S. ￿￿￿ R. H. T￿￿￿￿￿ (1995): “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 73–92.
B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, M., L. V. H￿￿￿￿￿, J. P. H￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ H. R. R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2009): Introduction to Meta-
Analysis, John Wiley & Sons.
C￿￿￿￿￿￿, C., L. B￿￿￿￿￿￿, G. L￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ R. T￿￿￿￿￿ (1997): “Labor Supply of New York
City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 407–441.
29
C￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, B., A. G￿￿￿￿￿, M. D. H￿￿￿￿￿￿, D. L￿￿, B. G￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, M. B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,
M. B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, J. G￿￿, P. L￿, ￿￿￿ A. R￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2017): “Stan: A Probabilistic Programming Lan-
guage,” Journal of Statistical Software, 76.
D￿ M￿￿￿￿￿￿, B., C. F. C￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ R. A￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2010): “Amygdala Damage Eliminates Mone-
tary Loss Aversion,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107, 3788–3792.
D￿￿￿￿V￿￿￿￿, S. (2018): “Structural Behavioral Economics,” inHandbook of Behavioral Economics -
Foundations and Applications, ed. by B. D. Bernheim, S. DellaVigna, andD. Laibson, Amsterdam:
Elsevier/North-Holland, vol. 1, 613–725.
D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, C., T. D. S￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿M.G￿￿￿￿ (2012): “Are Estimates of the Value of a Statistical
Life Exaggerated?” Journal of Health Economics, 31, 197–206.
D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, H. ￿￿￿ T. D. S￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2009): “Publication Selection Bias in Minimum-Wage
Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis,” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 47, 406–428.
D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, H., T. D. S￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ W. K. V￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2014): “Publication Selection and the
Income Elasticity of the Value of a Statistical Life,” Journal of Health Economics, 33, 67–75.
E￿￿￿￿, C. (2011): “Dictator Games: A Meta Study,” Experimental Economics, 14, 583–610.
E￿￿￿￿￿￿, K. M. M. ￿￿￿ A. F￿￿￿￿￿ (2014): “The Endowment E￿ect,” Annual Review of Economics,
6, 555–579.
F￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, P. C. ￿￿￿G. A. K￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (1979): “Two-Piece von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
Functions,” Decision Sciences, 10, 503–518.
F￿￿￿￿, R. G., S. D. L￿￿￿￿￿, J. L￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ S. S￿￿￿￿￿ (2012): “Enhancing the E￿cacy of Teacher
Incentives through Loss Aversion: A Field Experiment,” NBER Working Paper No. 18237.
G￿￿￿￿￿, A., J. B. C￿￿￿￿￿, H. S. S￿￿￿￿, D. B. D￿￿￿￿￿, A. V￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ D. B. R￿￿￿￿ (2014):
Bayesian Data Analysis, Boca Raton: CRC Press.
G￿￿￿￿, G. V. (1976): “Primary, Secondary, andMeta-Analysis of Research,” Educational Researcher,
5, 3–8.
G￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, J., J. K￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, S. N￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ G. S￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2018): “Meta-Analysis and the
Science of Research Synthesis,” Nature, 555, 175–182.
H￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, T. (2015): “Measuring Intertemporal Substitution: The Importance ofMethod Choices
and Selective Reporting,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 13, 1180–1204.
H￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, T., R. H￿￿￿￿￿￿, Z. I￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ M. R￿￿￿￿￿ (2015): “Cross-Country Heterogeneity
in Intertemporal Substitution,” Journal of International Economics, 96, 100–118.
H￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, T., M. R￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿A. S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2017): “Habit Formation in Consumption: A Meta-
Analysis,” European Economic Review, 95, 142–167.
30
H￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, P. ￿￿￿ B. K￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2018): “Behavioral Industrial Organization,” in Handbook of Be-
havioral Economics - Foundations and Applications, ed. by B. D. Bernheim, S. DellaVigna, and
D. Laibson, Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland, vol. 1, 517–612.
I￿￿￿, T., T. A. R￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ C. F. C￿￿￿￿￿￿ (forthcoming): “Meta-Analysis of Present-Bias Esti-
mation Using Convex Time Budgets,” The Economic Journal.
I￿￿￿￿￿, Z. ￿￿￿ T. H￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2013): “Determinants of Horizontal Spillovers from FDI: Evidence
from a Large Meta-Analysis,”World Development, 42, 1–15.
K￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, D. (2011): Thinking, Fast and Slow, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
K￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, D. ￿￿￿ A. T￿￿￿￿￿￿ (1979): “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,”
Econometrica, 47, 263–292.
K￿￿, E. H., A. M￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ L. Z￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2006): “What Has Mattered to Economics Since 1970,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 189–202.
K￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, V. ￿￿￿ P. P. W￿￿￿￿￿ (2005): “An Index of Loss Aversion,” Journal of Economic The-
ory, 122, 119–131.
K￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, J. K. (2010): “Bayesian Data Analysis,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Sci-
ence, 1, 658–676.
￿’H￿￿￿￿￿￿, O. ￿￿￿ F. M. V￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2019): “All Over the Map: A Worldwide Comparison of Risk
Preferences,” Quantitative Economics, 10, 185–215.
M￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, J., T. H￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ Z. I￿￿￿￿￿ (2020): “Individual Discount Rates: A Meta-Analysis
of Experimental Evidence,” Unpublished manuscript.
M￿E￿￿￿￿￿￿, R. (2016): Statistical Rethinking: A Bayesian Course with Examples in R and Stan,
CRC Press.
N￿￿￿￿￿￿, W. S. (2002): “Comparative Risk Sensitivity with Reference-Dependent Preferences,”
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 24, 131–142.
N￿￿￿￿￿￿, N. ￿￿￿ U. B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2014): “AMeta-Analysis of Loss Aversion in Product Choice,”
Journal of Retailing, 90, 182–197.
O￿￿￿￿, T. (1998): “Are Investors Reluctant to Realize their Losses?” The Journal of Finance, 53,
1775–1798.
O’D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, T. ￿￿￿ C. S￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2018): “Reference-Dependent Preferences,” in Handbook of
Behavioral Economics - Foundations and Applications, ed. by B. D. Bernheim, S. DellaVigna, and
D. Laibson, Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland, vol. 1.
O￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, H., R. S￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ G. V￿￿ D￿ K￿￿￿￿￿ (2004): “Cultural Di￿erences in Ultimatum
Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis,” Experimental Economics, 7, 171–188.
31
P￿￿￿￿￿￿, K. (1904): “Report on Certain Enteric Fever Inoculation Statistics,” BMJ, 2, 1243–1246.
R￿￿￿￿￿, M. O., M. W￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ T. H￿￿￿ (2017): “Estimating Cumulative Prospect Theory Parame-
ters from an International Survey,” Theory and Decision, 82, 567–596.
R￿￿￿￿, P. M. (1996): “Preferences, Promises, and the Politics of Entitlement,” in Individual and
Social Responsibility: Child Care, Education, Medical Care, and Long-Term Care in America, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 195–228.
R￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, R. (1979): “The File Drawer Problem and Tolerance for Null Results,” Psychological
Bulletin, 86, 638–641.
S￿￿￿￿￿￿, U. ￿￿￿ H. Z￿￿￿ (2005): “What Is Loss Aversion?” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 30,
157–167.
S￿￿￿ D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ T￿￿￿ (2020): “RStan: the R interface to Stan,” R package version 2.21.2,
http://mc-stan.org/.
S￿￿￿￿￿￿, T. D. (2001): “Wheat from Cha￿: Meta-analysis as Quantitative Literature Review,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, 131–150.
S￿￿￿￿￿￿, T. D. ￿￿￿H. D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2012): Meta-Regression Analysis in Economics and Business,
London: Routledge.
T￿￿￿￿, P. (2009): “The E￿ects of Loss Aversion on Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence,” Journal
of International Economics, 78, 154–167.
T￿￿￿￿￿, T. ￿￿￿ J. K. H￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2014): “A NewMeta-Analysis on the WTP/WTA Disparity,” Jour-
nal of Environmental Economics and Management, 68, 175–187.
T￿￿￿￿￿￿, A. ￿￿￿ D. K￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (1991): “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 1039–1061.
——— (1992): “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty,” Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323.
W￿￿￿￿￿, P. ￿￿￿ D. D￿￿￿￿￿￿ (1996): “Eliciting von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities when proba-
bilities are distorted or unknown,” Management Science, 42, 1131–1150.
W￿￿￿￿￿, P. ￿￿￿A. T￿￿￿￿￿￿ (1993): “An Axiomatization of Cumulative Prospect Theory,” Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty, 7, 147–175.
W￿￿￿￿￿, P. P. (2010): Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
W￿￿￿￿￿￿, L., T. L. M￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿N. S￿￿￿￿￿￿ (2018): “A Meta-Analysis of Loss Aversion in Risky
Contexts,” Unpublished manuscript.
W￿￿￿, M., M. O. R￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ T. H￿￿￿ (2017): “The Impact of Culture on Loss Aversion,” Journal
32
of Behavioral Decision Making, 30, 270–281.
W￿￿￿￿, M. ￿￿￿ C. F. C￿￿￿￿￿￿ (1998): “The Disposition E￿ect in Securities Trading: An Experi-
mental Analysis,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 33, 167–184.
Y￿￿￿￿, F. ￿￿￿ W. G. C￿￿￿￿￿￿ (1938): “The Analysis of Groups of Experiments,” The Journal of
Agricultural Science, 28, 556–580.
33
Supplementary Online Material
Meta-Analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss-Aversion




A.1 Paper Search and Inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A.2 Approximation and Imputation of Missing Standard Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A.3 Coded Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A.4 Journals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
B Bayesian Hierarchical Model 11
B.1 Modeling Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B.2 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
B.3 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.3.1 Estimation Using Subsets of the Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.3.2 Estimation Using the “Complete” Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B.3.3 Prior-Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
C Additional Figures and Tables 21
D “Classical” Meta-Analysis 27
E List of Articles Included in the Meta-Analysis 29
References 40
A Data
A.1 Paper Search and Inclusion
We searched for relevant papers on the scienti￿c citation indexing database Web of Science. We




OR "loss aversion coefficient"
OR "loss aversion index"




estimat* OR measur* OR experiment* OR survey
⌘
F￿￿￿￿￿ A.1: Keywords used in the search.
The initial search, made in the summer of 2017, returned a total hits of 1,547 papers. As a ￿rst
step of paper identi￿cation, we went through titles and abstracts and threw out 910 papers that
were clearly irrelevant for our study. We then read the remaining papers, applied our inclusion
criteria based on the content, and then coded information. We also used IDEAS/RePEc andGoogle
Scholar to search for unpublished working papers. Finally, we posted a message on the email list
of the Economic Science Association to ask for relevant papers (in February 2018).
1st round: Web of Science
Articles searched on the basis of abstract
Excluded papers that do not collect empirical data
nor estimate loss aversion coe￿cient
Read through of article and application of
inclusion criteria
Excluded papers that do not collect empirical data
nor estimate loss aversion coe￿cient
2nd round: The ESA mailing list and WP searchFinal set of papers (n = 150)
n = 1, 547
n = 637
F￿￿￿￿￿ A.2: Paper search and data construction.
1
A.2 Approximation and Imputation of Missing Standard Errors
The dataset includes 192 estimates (out of 607) of loss aversion coe￿cient without corresponding
standard errors (SEs). In order to keep these observations in our meta-analysis, we approximated
and imputed missing SEs using other available information.
First, we calculated SEs of four observations from p-values of the two-sided test for the null




where   1 is the quantile function of the standard normal distribution.
Second, we approximated 64 SEs from inter-quartile range (IQR) and sample size, using
se ⇡ 1.35 ⇥ IQRp
n
.
Note that the use of this approximation formula is legitimate if the parameters are normally
distributed in the population, which is a strong assumption in our dataset. Nevertheless, obtaining
even an “approximated” SE seemed preferable to dropping the observation entirely, or to making
other, even stronger, assumptions allowing us to keep the observation.
Finally, we imputed remaining 124 missing SEs. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters
characterizing their distribution in the data, log(seo) ⇠ N(µse,  2se). Using these distributional
parameters, we can then estimate themissing values in SE by letting log(sem) ⇠ N(bµse,b  2se), where
the subscripts o and m stand for observed and missing, respectively, and (bµse,b se) are estimated
quantities.
Implementing this estimation, we will thus obtain values for the missing observations in SE
that have the same mean and variance. We can, however, do much better than that if we can
￿nd other variables in our dataset that are signi￿cantly associated with SEs (McElreath, 2016).
As it turns out, the single best predictor of the SE is the loss aversion estimate itself. Once it is
controlled for, no other predictor—including the measurement type and the square root of the
number of observations—is signi￿cant. The loss aversion coe￿cient explains 51% of the variance
in SEs. By letting µse =  se +  se , we can thus get much better imputation results than by only
using the distributional characteristics.
Figure A.4 shows the imputed standard errors juxtaposed with the observed standard errors,
and plotted against the loss aversion coe￿cient. The solid line indicates the regression line of
the SE on loss aversion in the subset of data for which we observe the SE. The estimates of loss
aversion with and without SEs exhibit systematic di￿erence (p = 0.002, Wilcoxon rank sum test;
Figure A.3 and Figure A.4B) but, as we would expect, the imputed SEs are no di￿erent than the
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F￿￿￿￿￿ A.3: Empirical CDF of reported loss aversion coe￿cient   by the type of estimates and by the type
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F￿￿￿￿￿A.4: Imputation of standard errors. Notes: The solid line is the regression line of the standard errors
on loss aversion in the data with observed standard errors. The x-axis is cut o￿ at 6 for better visualization.
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A.3 Coded Variables
T￿￿￿￿ A.1: List of coded variables.
Variable Description
Atricle meta data
main_lastnames Last names of the authors
main_firstnames First names of the authors
main_title Title of the paper
main_published = 1 if published
main_yearpub Year of publication
main_journal Journal
main_length Number of pages (excluding online appendices)
main_affliations A￿liations of the authors
main_fund Funding sources
Type of data
type_lab_exp = 1 if laboratory experiment
type_field_exp = 1 if ￿eld experiment
type_class_exp = 1 if classroom experiment
type_online_exp = 1 if online experiment
type_gameshow = 1 if TV game show
type_field_other = 1 if other ￿eld data
Location of the experiment
loc_lab = 1 if laboratory study
loc_field = 1 if ￿eld study
loc_online = 1 if online study







subject_children = 1 if subjects are children
subject_uni = 1 if subjects are university students/sta￿s
subject_elderly = 1 if elderly population
subject_gen = 1 if general population
subject_farm = 1 if subjects are farmers
subject_mixed = 1 if mixed subject population
subject_monkey = 1 if subjects are monkeys
subject_unknown = 1 if unknown population
Reward
reward_real = 1 if real reward
reward_deception = 1 if deception is used
reward_money = 1 if monetary reward
reward_food = 1 if food reward
reward_cons_good = 1 if consumption goods
reward_env_good = 1 if environmental goods
reward_health = 1 if health
reward_mixed = 1 if mixed type
reward_other = 1 if other type of reward
Method
method_question = 1 if questionnaire
method_seqbin = 1 if sequential binary choice
method_mpl = 1 if multiple price list
method_bdm = 1 if BDM
method_matching = 1 if matching
method_gp = 1 if Gneezy-Potters
method_multi = 1 if combination of multiple methods
method_other = 1 if other method




spec_u_est = 1 if utility function is parametrically estimated
spec_nonparametric = 1 if utility function is nonparametrically recovered
spec_u_crra = 1 if CRRA is assumed
spec_u_cara = 1 if CARA is assumed
spec_u_linear = 1 if linear utility is assumed
spec_u_other = 1 if other parametric form is assumed
Loss aversion
loss_kahneman_tversky = 1 if   is de￿ned à la Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
loss_neilson = 1 if   is de￿ned à la Neilson (2002)
loss_wakker_tversky = 1 if   is de￿ned à la Wakker and Tversky (1993)
loss_bowman = 1 if   is de￿ned à la Bowman et al. (1999)
loss_kobberling_wakker = 1 if   is de￿ned à la Köbberling and Wakker (2005)
loss_koszegi_rabin = 1 if   is de￿ned à la Kőszegi and Rabin (2006)
Estimates
la Loss aversion coe￿cient  
se SE of   (reported/calculated)
se_imp SE of   (reported/calculated and imputed)
se_type Type of SE (reported/calculated or imputed)
sd Standard deviation of  
iqr Inter-quartile range of  
pv p-value of the null hypothesis H0 :   = 1 (if reported)
N Sample size




ares_present = 1 if aggregate-level estimates is reported
ares_N Number of observations
ares_loss Estimated loss aversion coe￿cient  
ares_loss_error Standard error of estimated  
ares_ucurv_loss Estimated u 
ares_ucurv_loss_error Standard error of estimated u 
ares_ucurv_gain Estimated u+
ares_ucurv_gain_error Standard error of estimated u+
ares_ucurv_eq = 1 if u+ = u  is assumed
Individual-level estimation results
ires_present = 1 if individual-level estimates is reported
ires_N Number of subjects
ires_loss_mean Mean of the distribution of  
ires_loss_median Median of the distribution of  
ires_loss_var Variance of the distribution of  
ires_loss_sd Standard deviation of the distribution of  
ires_loss_error Standard error of mean  
ires_loss_25_percentile Q1 of the distribution of  
ires_loss_75_percentile Q3 of the distribution of  
ires_loss_iqr IQR of the distribution of  
ires_ucurv_loss_mean Mean of the distribution of u 
ires_ucurv_loss_median Median of the distribution of u 
ires_ucurv_loss_var Variance of the distribution of u 
ires_ucurv_loss_error Standard error of the distribution of u 
ires_ucurv_gain_mean Mean of the distribution of u+
ires_ucurv_gain_median Median of the distribution of u+
ires_ucurv_gain_var Variance of the distribution of u+
ires_ucurv_gain_error Standard error of the distribution of u+
ires_ucurv_eq = 1 if u+ = u  is assumed
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A.4 Journals
T￿￿￿￿ A.2: List of journals and disciplines.
Journal Category
1 Addiction Substance Abuse
2 Addictive Behaviors and Decision Making Psychology, Applied
3 American Economic Journal: Economic Policy Economics
4 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Economics
5 American Economic Review Economics
6 American Journal of Agricultural Economics Agriculture/Agronomy
7 Behavioral Neuroscience Neurosciences
8 Brain Neurosciences
9 Cognition & Emotion Psychology
10 Consciousness and Cognition Psychology, Experimental
11 Current Biology Cell Biology
12 Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience Psychology, Development
13 Ecological Economics Ecology
14 Economic Inquiry Economics
15 Economics Letters Economics & Business
16 Ekonomický časopis Economics
17 Emotion Psychology, Experimental
18 Environment and Development Economics Economics
19 European Economic Review Economics
20 European Journal of Operational Research Operations Research & Management Science
21 European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research Social Sciences, General
22 European Review of Agricultural Economics Economics & Business
23 Experimental Economics Economics
24 Frontiers in Human Neuroscience Psychology
25 Frontiers in Psychology Psychology, Multidisciplinary
26 Games and Economic Behavior Economics
27 International Economic Review Economics
28 International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics Economics & Business
29 International Journal of Research in Marketing Economics & Business
30 Journal of African Economics Agricultural Sciences
31 Journal of Banking & Finance Business, Finance
32 Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Economics
33 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Psychology, Applied
34 Journal of Behavioral Finance Business, Finance
35 Journal of Business and Economic Statistics Business & Economics
36 Journal of Consumer Research Economics
37 Journal of Development Economics Economics
38 Journal of Developmental Studies Social Sciences, General
39 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Economics
40 Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control Economics
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Journal Category
41 Journal of Economic Psychology Economics
42 Journal of Empirical Finance Economics
43 Journal of Experimental Psychology: General Psychology
44 Journal of Gambling Studies Substance Abuse
45 Journal of Health Economics Economics & Business
46 Journal of International Economics Economics
47 Journal of Marketing Research Economics
48 Journal of Mathematical Psychology Psychology, Mathematical
49 Journal of Political Economy Economics
50 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Business & Economics
51 Judgment and Decision Making Psychiatry/Psychology
52 Management Science Management
53 Marketing Science Economics
54 Nature Multidisciplinary Sciences
55 NeuroImage Neurosciences
56 Neuron Neurosciences
57 Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment Psychiatry
58 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes Management
59 PLoS Computational Biology Biochemical Research Methods
60 PloS One Multidisciplinary Sciences
61 PNAS Multidisciplinary Sciences
62 Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences Evolutionary Biology
63 PsicolÃ￿gica
64 Psychiatry Research Psychiatry/Psychology
65 Psychological Science Psychology
66 Psychology and Aging Gerontology
67 Quantitative Finance Economics
68 Quarterly Journal of Economics Economics
69 Rationality and Society Social Sciences, General
70 Review of Managerial Science Management
71 Revista Espanola de Financiacion y Contabilidad Business, Finance
72 Science Multidisciplinary Sciences
73 The Review of Economics and Statistics Economics
74 Theory and Decision Economics
75 Tourism Management Hospitality, Leisure, Sport & Tourism
76 Transportation Research Part B Transportation Science & Technology
77 Transportation Research Record Transportation Science & Technology
78 World Development Economics
















B Bayesian Hierarchical Model
B.1 Modeling Framework
The main goal of our meta-analysis is ￿rst to obtain the “best available” estimate of the loss aver-
sion coe￿cient   combining the available information in the literature and then to understand
the heterogeneity of reported estimates across studies. To this end, we analyze the data using a
Bayesian hierarchical modeling approach.
Meta-analysis is naturally hierarchical. The e￿ect sizes reported in di￿erent studies are sum-
mary measures of individual-level behavior. We summarize these measures by estimating their
mean and variation based on a given model. Additional hierarchical levels can be introduced e.g.,
to deal with statistical dependence in estimates, such as when one and the same paper or study
reports multiple estimates.
Hierarchical models, in turn, are naturally Bayesian (Gelman and Hill, 2006; McElreath, 2016).
To see this, one can picture the estimated aggregate mean as an endogenous prior, that will then
in￿uence the estimates of the “true” study-level e￿ect, depending on the uncertainty surround-
ing the estimate itself—a statistical procedure known as “shrinkage” or “pooling”. One of the
great advantages of the Bayesian approach is further that the estimate emerging from the meta-
analysis—the posterior mean of our analysis—can serve as a prior for future empirical studies,
and is easy to update with additional evidence. This is conductive to the systematic quantitative
accumulation of knowledge—the prime objective of meta-analysis.
Consider the dataset ( i, se2i )mi=1, where  i is the ith measurement (or observation) of the loss
aversion coe￿cient in the dataset and sei is the associated standard error that captures the un-
certainty surrounding the estimate. We assume that the ith reported estimate  i is normally
distributed around the parameter  i :
 i |  i, sei ⇠ N( i, se2i ), (B.1)
where the variability is due to the sampling variation captured by the known standard error sei .1
Sampling variation is part of the observed variation in the reported estimates ( i)mi=1, but it
may not be all, since there is a possibility of “genuine” heterogeneity across measurements (due to
di￿erent settings, for example). We model this by assuming that each  i is normally distributed,
adding another level to the hierarchy:
 i |  0,   ⇠ N( 0,   2), (B.2)
1The parameter  i is often referred to as the “true e￿ect size” in the random-e￿ects meta-analysis.
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where  0 is the overall mean of the estimated loss aversion parameters  i , and   is its standard
deviation, capturing the variation between observations in the data. The overall variance in the
data, therefore, consists of two parts, the between-observation variance,   2, and the individual
sampling variation coming from measurement uncertainty, se2. This can be clearly seen by com-
bining expressions (B.1) and (B.2) into one:
 i |  0,   , sei ⇠ N( 0,   2 + se2i ).
Note that this formulation ismathematically equivalent to the classical formulation of random-
e￿ects meta-analysis (DerSimonian and Laird, 1986), which is typically expressed as
 i =  i +  i =  0 +  i +  i,
where  i ⇠ N(0, se2i ) is a sampling error of  i as an estimate of  i , and each observation-speci￿c
“true” e￿ect  i is decomposed into  0 (the overall mean) and the sampling error  j . It is fur-
ther assumed that  i ⇠ N(0,   2), where   2 is the between-observation heterogeneity, beyond the
mere sampling variance. When   = 0, this model reduces to a ￿xed-e￿ect meta-analysis. This
highlights the central assumption underlying ￿xed-e￿ect meta-analysis—that di￿erent estimates
di￿er only based on random sampling variation—which clearly does not seem adequate for the
diverse set of estimates included in our meta-analysis. We thus conduct a random-e￿ects analy-
sis, allowing for both random sampling variation and systematic di￿erences between studies and
estimates.
In this model, each observation  i in the data will be “pooled” towards the overall mean  0,
with the extent of the pooling depending on two factors: (i) the standard error associated with
the estimate; and (ii) how far the estimate lies from the estimated mean,  0. As we see above,
the variance across observations is decomposed into two parts—variance due to error in estima-
tion, and the genuine between-observation heterogeneity. The pooling equation for a speci￿c
observation i takes the following form
 i = (1    i) i +  i 0, (B.3)




  2 + se2
i
. (B.4)
The equation makes it clear that, the larger the SE ceteris paribus, the larger the pooling factor,
and thus the closer the estimate will be drawn to the overall mean estimate of the population,
indicated by  0. At the same time, the smaller the between study variation captured by   2, the
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more pooling towards the population mean. This makes intuitive sense—estimates are pooled
more to the extent that all estimates in the population are similar to each other, and to the extent
that they are characterized by a low degree of precision.
It is now straightforward to account for variation across estimates driven by observable char-
acteristics—commonly referred to as meta-regression—by letting
 i =  i + Xi  +  i, (B.5)
where  i is the intercept of the regression, Xi a matrix of observable study characteristics for
observation i , and   is a vector of regression coe￿cients. Notice that the residual is distributed
as  i ⇠ N(0,   2). By comparing the variance in this model to the variance estimated in a model
empty of covariates, i.e. where Xi contains no entries, we will be able to assess what extent of
the overall variance between observations is explained by the observation-level characteristics
encoded in Xi . In particular, the variance explained is given by 1   (  21 /  20 ), where   20 is the
estimated variance between observation in a model empty of covariates, and   21 is the equivalent
variance term estimated in the meta-regression model.
While this normal-normal structure expressed in equations (B.1, B.2) is the benchmark setup
we use, it will quickly become interesting to relax the modelling assumptions described here,
e.g., by replacing the normal distribution with a robust student-t distribution or an asymmetric
log-normal distribution, and by allowing for additional hierarchical levels to account for the lack
of independence in the observations in our data.
We estimate the model in Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017) using the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
simulations, an algorithm for Markov Chain Monte Carlo, and launch it from R (https://www.
r-project.org/) using RStan (Stan Development Team, 2020). Priors for the population-level
parameters are chosen in such a way as to be mildly regularizing, i.e., they are informative, but
typically encompass ranges that are one order of magnitude larger than the estimated values we
expect based on the range of the data (McElreath, 2016). Priors for lower-level parameters are
then constituted by the endogenously estimated population-level parameters. The estimates we
report are not sensitive to the choice of the particular priors we use (Section B.3.3 below).
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B.2 Estimation
In Section 4.3, we started from ￿tting the benchmarkmodel expressed as equations (B.1) and (B.2):
 i |  i, sei ⇠ N( i, se2i ),
 i |  0,   ⇠ N( 0,   2),
 0 ⇠ half N(1, 5),
  ⇠ half N(0, 5).
(M1a)
(This model was called M1 in Section 4.3.) The estimated overall mean  0 is 1.810 with a 95%
credible interval (CrI) of [1.742, 1.880].
Pooling. Equations (B.3) and (B.4) describe themechanismunderlying the pooling. The amount
of pooling applied to an observation—i.e. the extent to which an estimated parameter  i is drawn
towards the overall mean  0 from its observed value  i—will depend on the SE associated with
the observation, and its distance from the mean. This is illustrated in Figure B.1, which shows a
scatter plot of the estimated loss aversion parameter,  i , against the observed parameter,  i . For
standard errors up to 0.4, almost no pooling is observed even for values that fall relatively far
from the mean. Pooling increases for larger SEs between 0.4 and 1, and becomes very strong for
even larger SEs. The farther an observation falls from the mean, the more it is pooled, ceteris
paribus. We further observe very strong pooling for large observations because the standard

















0.15 < se < 0.4
0.4 < se < 1
1 < se
F￿￿￿￿￿ B.1: Pooling of estimates by SE. Notes: The horizontal dotted line corresponds to the estimated
overall mean  0 = 1.810. The axes are cut o￿ at six for better visualization.
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Additional models. In addition to models M1a and M2 discussed in Section 4.3, we estimated
two additional “intermediate” models.
The ￿rst alternative model is a straightforward extension of model M1a, replacing the normal
distribution with a log-normal distribution:
 i |  i, sei ⇠ N( i, se2i ),
 i |  `0,  ` ⇠ logN( `0,   2` ),
 
`
0 ⇠ N(1, 5),
 ` ⇠ half N(0, 5).
(M1b)
Note the super-/sub-scripts ` in the location and scale parameters ( `0,   2` ) of the log-normal dis-
tribution. We can calculate the mean and the median of the distribution by exp( `0 +   2` /2) and
exp( `0), respectively. The mean of the log-normal distribution is given by  0 ⌘ exp( `0 +   2` /2).
The second alternative model tries to address the non-independence of reported estimates by
explicitly modeling the nesting of observations in papers. To do this, we introduce paper-level
estimates as an additional hierarchical level. Let  pi be the ith estimate reported in paper p. We
formulate a model as follows:
 pi |  pi, sepi ⇠ N( pi, se2pi),
 pi |  p, p ⇠ N( p,  2p ),
 p |  `0,  ` ⇠ logN( `0,   2` ),
 
`
0 ⇠ N(1, 5),
 ` ⇠ half N(0, 5),
 p ⇠ half N(0, 5).
(M1c)
The system now explicitly models the nesting of the estimated observation-level parameters,  pi ,
in paper-level estimates,  p . The latter are then modeled as following a log-normal distribution,
just as previously. Figure B.2 illustrates the idea behind this formulation.
Figure B.3 below summarizes all four models we estimated.
Estimating model M1b, we obtain a mean  0 of 1.826, with a 95% CrI of [1.741, 1.880]. Fig-
ure B.4 (top right panel) shows the posterior predictive distribution from the estimation of this
model. The￿t can be seen to bemuch better than that of the baseline normal-normalmodel shown
above, and to ￿t the actual observations closely. We thus conclude that a log-normal distribution
provides a good ￿t to the data. The mean loss aversion  0 is 2.052 (95% CrI [1.911, 2.209]), under
model M1c. The ￿t to the data, however, appears to be a little o￿, allowing room for improvement
(Figure B.4, bottom left panel). The posterior predictive distribution puts much larger likelihood
on values between 1.8 and 3 while it puts smaller likelihood on values below 1.5.
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 pi |  pi, sepi ⇠ N( pi, se2pi)
 pi |  p, p ⇠ F ( p,  2p )














F￿￿￿￿￿ B.2: Illustration of the nesting structure inmodelsM1c andM2. For the paper-level distribution F in
the middle layer, model M1c assumes a normal distribution and model M2 assumes a student-t distribution
with additional parameter df .
Model M1a
 i |  i, sei ⇠ N( i, se2i ),
 i |  0,   ⇠ N( 0,   2),
 0 ⇠ half N(1,  ),
  ⇠ half N(0,  ).
Model M1b
 i |  i, sei ⇠ N( i, se2i ),
 i |  `0,  ` ⇠ logN( `0,   2` ),
 
`
0 ⇠ N(1,  ),
 ` ⇠ half N(0,  ).
Model M1c
 pi |  pi, sepi ⇠ N( pi, se2pi),
 pi |  p, p ⇠ N( p,  2p ),
 p |  `0,  ` ⇠ logN( `0,   2` ),
 
`
0 ⇠ N(1,  ),
 ` ⇠ half N(0,  ),
 p ⇠ half N(0,  ).
Model M2
 pi |  pi, sepi ⇠ N( pi, se2pi),
 pi | df ,  p, p ⇠ t(df ,  p,  2p ),
 p |  `0,  ` ⇠ logN( `0,   2` ),
 
`
0 ⇠ N(1,  ),
 ` ⇠ half N(0,  ),
df ⇠ half N(0,  ),
 p ⇠ half N(0,  ).
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F￿￿￿￿￿ B.4: Distributions of reported and estimated  , and posterior predictive distribution of  .
T￿￿￿￿ B.1: Summary of estimation results.
Distributional assumption Posterior of  0 Posterior of  
Model Obs. level Paper level Pop. level Mean SD 2.5% 97.5% Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
M1a Normal Normal 1.810 0.036 1.741 1.880 0.747 0.027 0.695 0.801
M1b Normal Log-normal 1.826 0.039 1.754 1.904 0.816 0.260 0.740 0.899
M1c Normal Normal Log-normal 2.052 0.076 1.911 2.209 0.752 0.358 0.602 0.929
M2 Normal Student-t Log-normal 1.955 0.072 1.824 2.104 0.743 0.342 0.605 0.907
Notes: In Models M1c and M2, ( 0,   ) are calculated from the log-normal parameters ( `0,  `) by  0 =
exp( `0 +   2` /2) and   2 = [exp(  2` )   1] exp(2 `0 +   2` ).
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B.3 Robustness Checks
B.3.1 Estimation Using Subsets of the Dataset
T￿￿￿￿ B.2: Estimation result for each type of reported  .
Distributional assumption Posterior of  0
Model Type Obs. level Paper level Pop. level Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
M1a Aggregate Normal Normal 1.704 0.044 1.619 1.792
Individual-mean Normal Normal 2.439 0.103 2.242 2.642
Individual-median Normal Normal 1.704 0.046 1.612 1.796
M2 Aggregate Normal Student-t Log-normal 1.846 0.111 1.650 2.083
Individual-mean Normal Student-t Log-normal 2.412 0.148 2.148 2.731
Individual-median Normal Student-t Log-normal 1.711 0.085 1.557 1.890
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F￿￿￿￿￿ B.5: Estimation of model M2 for each type of reported loss aversion coe￿cient separately. (A Dis-
tributions of reported  pi (dashed lines) and posterior predictive distributions (solid lines). (BC) Posterior
distributions of  0 and   . Notes: ( 0,   ) are calculated from the log-normal parameters ( `0,  `) are calculated
by  0 = exp( `0 +   2` /2) and   2 = [exp(  2` )   1] exp(2 `0 +   2` ).
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B.3.2 Estimation Using the “Complete” Dataset
T￿￿￿￿ B.3: Sensitivity to SE imputation. (A) All data, including observations with imputed SEs (identical
to Table 5). (C) Complete data, including only observations where associated SEs are available.
Distributional assumption Posterior of  0 Posterior of  
Model Obs. level Paper level Pop. level Mean SD 2.5% 97.5% Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
M1a A Normal Normal 1.810 0.036 1.741 1.880 0.747 0.027 0.695 0.801
C Normal Normal 1.713 0.041 1.632 1.793 0.714 0.033 0.653 0.780
M1b A Normal Log-normal 1.826 0.039 1.754 1.904 0.816 0.260 0.740 0.899
C Normal Log-normal 1.709 0.039 1.636 1.789 0.670 0.229 0.598 0.750
M1c A Normal Normal Log-normal 2.052 0.076 1.911 2.209 0.752 0.358 0.602 0.929
C Normal Normal Log-normal 2.041 0.097 1.866 2.242 0.877 0.449 0.684 1.122
M2 A Normal Student-t Log-normal 1.955 0.072 1.824 2.104 0.743 0.342 0.605 0.907
C Normal Student-t Log-normal 1.959 0.092 1.791 2.152 0.822 0.418 0.642 1.046
Notes: In Models M1c and M2, ( 0,   ) are calculated from log-normal parameters ( `0,  `) by  0 = exp( `0 +
 
2
` /2) and   2 = [exp(  2` )   1] exp(2 `0 +   2` ).
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B.3.3 Prior-Sensitivity Analysis
T￿￿￿￿ B.4: Sensitivity to prior speci￿cations. The standard deviation for the half-normal distribution is set
at   2 {5, 10}.
Distributional assumption Posterior of  0 Posterior of  
Model   Obs. level Paper level Pop. level Mean SD 2.5% 97.5% Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
M1a 5 Normal Normal 1.810 0.036 1.741 1.880 0.747 0.027 0.695 0.801
10 Normal Normal 1.809 0.035 1.742 1.878 0.747 0.028 0.695 0.804
M1b 5 Normal Log-normal 1.826 0.039 1.754 1.904 0.816 0.260 0.740 0.899
10 Normal Log-normal 1.826 0.038 1.754 1.901 0.815 0.255 0.741 0.895
M1c 5 Normal Normal Log-normal 2.052 0.076 1.911 2.209 0.752 0.358 0.602 0.929
10 Normal Normal Log-normal 2.051 0.076 1.906 2.209 0.753 0.362 0.601 0.936
M2 5 Normal Student-t Log-normal 1.955 0.072 1.824 2.104 0.743 0.342 0.605 0.907
10 Normal Student-t Log-normal 1.954 0.071 1.822 2.102 0.742 0.341 0.605 0.903
Notes: In Models M1c and M2, ( 0,   ) are calculated from log-normal parameters ( `0,  `) by  0 = exp( `0 +
 
2
` /2) and   2 = [exp(  2` )   1] exp(2 `0 +   2` ).
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.1: Study location. Notes: It is possible that the same dataset was used in two or more papers
(e.g., a cross-country dataset from Rieger et al. (2017) and Wang et al. (2017) mentioned above) to estimate























































F￿￿￿￿￿ C.2: Reported loss aversion coe￿cients ( ) over time. Notes: The  -axis is cut o￿ at 7 for better
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F￿￿￿￿￿C.5: Comparing 85 pairs of individual-level means andmedians in 34 papers that report both. Notes:
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F￿￿￿￿￿ C.6: Estimated   and precision (1/se). (A) Complete dataset with reported SE. (B) A subset of the






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F￿￿￿￿￿ C.8: Estimated loss aversion coe￿cient   and study characteristics. (A) Type of data. (B) Elicitation
method. (C) Subject population. (D) Reward type. (E) Speci￿cation of basic utility u. (F) Reference point.
(G) Journal discipline. (H) Continent. Notes: The horizontal dashed line in each panel corresponds to   = 1.
The  -axis is cut o￿ at 9 for visual clarity of lower numbers.
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T￿￿￿￿ C.1: Random-e￿ects meta-regression. Posterior distributions of coe￿cients   .
Category Variable Median 2.5% 16.5% 83.5% 97.5%
Type of the estimate Individual-level mean baseline
Individual-level median  0.276  0.386  0.329  0.226  0.173
Aggregate-level  0.360  0.597  0.475  0.248  0.129
Type of the data Lab experiment baseline
Field experiment 0.536  0.003 0.274 0.792 1.059
Class experiment 0.060  0.497  0.207 0.324 0.614
Online experiment  0.112  0.626  0.374 0.150 0.397
Other ￿eld data  0.258  0.697  0.475  0.046 0.183
Subject pool Univ. population baseline
General 0.163  0.137 0.017 0.309 0.467
Farmer 0.400  0.300 0.056 0.740 1.106
Other  0.083  0.441  0.257 0.089 0.273
Reward Hypothetical money baseline
Real money  0.042  0.328  0.181 0.098 0.255
Non-money  0.113  0.458  0.276 0.048 0.211
Method Binary choice baseline
Survey 0.315  0.244 0.051 0.575 0.852
Matching 0.458  0.805  0.104 0.983 1.522
Other 0.287 0.003 0.150 0.419 0.561
Functional form of u CRRA same curvature baseline
CRRA di￿ curvature  0.113  0.400  0.254 0.034 0.189
CARA 0.095  0.390  0.146 0.320 0.543
Linear 0.179  0.177 0.006 0.348 0.526
Other  0.099  0.481  0.283 0.077 0.259
Reference point Zero baseline
Status quo 0.041  0.310  0.129 0.205 0.372
Expectation 0.094  0.698  0.279 0.504 0.995
Other  0.062  0.410  0.230 0.103 0.271
De￿nition of   Kahneman and Tversky (1979) baseline
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) 0.234  0.249 0.011 0.442 0.666
Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) 0.451  0.673  0.086 0.963 1.499
Other  1.069  1.594  1.315  0.805  0.487
Unknown  0.658  1.379  0.994  0.333 0.011
Continent Europe baseline
North America  0.036  0.199  0.115 0.042 0.126
Asia  0.050  0.150  0.100  0.001 0.051
South America  0.048  0.249  0.144 0.056 0.174
Africa  0.186  0.443  0.309  0.055 0.097
Oceania  0.404  0.619  0.504  0.306  0.202
Multiple 0.039  0.412  0.138 0.214 0.466
Publication status Econ journal baseline
Non-econ journal  0.016  0.312  0.155 0.126 0.276
Unpublished  0.277  0.709  0.486  0.074 0.137
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D “Classical” Meta-Analysis
The random-e￿ects meta-analysis (DerSimonian and Laird, 1986) assumes that
 i = µi +  i =  0 +  i +  i, (D.1)
where  i ⇠ N(0, se2i ) is a sampling variation of  i as an estimate of µi , and the observation-
speci￿c “true” e￿ect µi is decomposed into  0 (the overall mean) and the sampling variation  i . It
is assumed that  i ⇠ N(0,   2), where   2 is the genuine heterogeneity, beyond the mere sampling
variance, that must be estimated. Note that the random-e￿ects model (D.1) reduces to the ￿xed-











where the weight is given by  i = 1/(se2i +  ̂ 2) and  ̂ 2 is the estimate of   2. As we explained in
Section B.1 above, the model (D.1) is mathematically equivalent to model M1a. Note also that our
dataset includes statistically dependent estimates. In order to account for such dependency, we
use cluster-robust variance estimation to account for correlation of estimates among each study
(Hedges et al., 2010).
We also apply a three-level modeling to handle statistically-dependent estimates. Let  pi de-
note the ith estimate of   from paper p. The ￿rst level is  pi = µpi +  pi , where µpi is the “true”
loss aversion coe￿cient and  pi ⇠ N(0, se2pi) for the ith estimate in paper p. The second level is
µpi =  p +  
(2)
pi
, where  p is the average loss aversion in paper p and   (2)pi ⇠ N(0,   2(2)). Finally, the
third level is  p =  0 +   (3)p , where  0 is the population average of   and  
(3)
p ⇠ N(0,   2(3)). These
equations are combined into a single model:





p +  pi . (D.2)
We estimate a random-e￿ects model (B.1) and a multi-level model (D.2). Results are presented
in Table D.1: columns (1) and (2) use the subset of data where both   and SE are reported (or
reconstructed from other available information), and columns (3) and (4) use the full data where
missing SEs are imputed as described above.
Random-e￿ects estimate shows the average loss aversion coe￿cient between 1.7 and 1.8. The
null hypothesis of no loss aversion (i.e., H0 :   = 1) is rejected at the conventional 5% signi￿cance
level. We also look at the I 2 statistic (Higgins and Thompson, 2002), which measures the amount
of heterogeneity relative to the total amount of variance in the observed e￿ects. Formally, the I 2





 ̂ 2 + s2
⇥ 100,
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T￿￿￿￿ D.1: “Classical” meta-analytic average of loss aversion coe￿cient.
SE reported All data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE ML RE ML
 0 1.7124 1.8854 1.8088 1.9373
(0.0874) (0.0811) (0.0761) (0.0669)
p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
 ̂
2 0.5074 0.5562




2 (within paper) 15.4057 34.0375
I
2 (between paper) 84.2990 65.5952
Observations 352 352 521 521
Clusters 114 114 150 150
Notes: p-values are from the two-sided test of the null hypothesis H0 :  0 = 1. Standard errors in parentheses
are cluster-robust (Hedges et al., 2010). For observations which have both individual-level mean and median, we
keep the median. Columns (1)-(2), “SE reported”, use the complete dataset where SEs are reported in the paper.
Columns (3)-(4), “All data”, use the full dataset where missing SEs are approximated from available information or
imputed. One observation with   = 23.46 (the maximum value in the dataset) is excluded because the very large
imputed SE produces an error in the estimation code.





is the “typical” sampling variance of the observed e￿ect sizes, where  i = 1/se2i . We observe that
99% of the total variability in estimates are due to between-observation heterogeneity.
Taking into account the hierarchical structure of our dataset, the multi-level model provides
the average loss aversion coe￿cient about 1.9, that is slightly higher than random-e￿ect estimates
discussed above. The heterogeneity measure I 2 adapted to the multi-level speci￿cation shows
that 84% of of total variance is due to between-paper heterogeneity, 15% is due to within-paper
heterogeneity, and the rest (less than 1%) is sampling variation (column (2)). The contribution
of between-paper heterogeneity decreases to 66% when we use the full dataset with imputed
standard errors (column (4)).
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